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Introduction 
Abigail Ross, a sophomore at Tulsa University, reported to school 
officials in 2014 that Patrick Swilling Jr., one of the school’s basketball 
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players, raped her.1 In the course of the school’s investigation of her 
complaint, Ross learned that years earlier, Tulsa University Campus 
Police (“TUCP”) officers fielded a pair of complaints that Swilling had 
raped another student.2 The earlier victim maintained that she told the 
officers that she had been raped, but the director of the police 
department, later claiming that she denied ever being raped, chose not 
to document the report or alert the administration.3 
During Swilling’s disciplinary hearing, the school refused to allow 
Ms. Ross to make any mention of the earlier rape report—or the two 
rape reports that surfaced during the investigation—and applied 
“strained reasoning” to conclude that Swilling had probably not raped 
Ross.4 Ross dropped out of classes in the spring semester and never re-
turned to Tulsa University after the school issued its report.5 
Ross filed a complaint alleging that the university had violated 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 19726 through its deliberate 
indifference to the 2012 rape report and her report.7 The U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma granted the university’s 
motion for summary judgment on those claims,8 and the Tenth Circuit 
affirmed, holding that the school could not be held liable because no 
one had notified an “appropriate person,” i.e., an official “with 
authority to take corrective action,”9 that Swilling’s presence posed a 
risk to the campus community.10 
While the District Court had found three different bases for 
concluding that the campus security officers who fielded the 2012 report 
were appropriate persons,11 the Tenth Circuit disagreed, holding that 
none of those reasons were adequate: First, although TUCP was 
supposed to initiate the school’s “corrective action” process when it 
received a report of sexual assault, the Tenth Circuit said this was 
 
1. Ross v. Univ. of Tulsa, 180 F. Supp. 3d 951, 954 (N.D. Okla. 2016), aff’d, 
859 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed, No. 17-969, 2018 WL 
333856 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2018). 
2. Id. at 957–59. 
3. Id. at 958. 
4. Id. at 961, 973. 
5. Id. at 963. 
6. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012). 
7. Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶ 44, Ross v. Univ. of Tulsa, 180 F. Supp. 
3d 951 (No. 4:14–cv–00484-TCK-PJC), 2014 WL 4087919. 
8. Ross, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 978. 
9. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998). 
10. Ross, 859 F.3d at 1288–92. 
11. Ross, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 966. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 4·2018 
No One Is an Inappropriate Person 
1345 
inadequate because the officers were required to pass the report on to 
someone who could take corrective action—not to take corrective action 
themselves;12 Second, although TUCP consists of officers from the Tulsa 
Police Department and its own armed 13  investigators with arrest 
authority,14 the Tenth Circuit concluded that “[i]t is not clear” how a 
police investigation into rape allegations could constitute corrective 
action, stating that “[p]erhaps investigation is a form of corrective 
action; perhaps not. The answer is not self-evident . . . .”;15 Finally, 
the District Court concluded that letting the university tell students 
that TUCP would institute corrective action and then letting TUCP 
neglect that obligation would allow the university to “effectively shield 
itself from Title IX civil liability.”16 The Tenth Circuit rejected this 
rationale, as well; even if university policy tasked TUCP with beginning 
corrective measures, it had not “expressly” labeled TUCP or its director 
as an “appropriate person[].”17 
The court held that employees who are merely cogs in the wheel of 
the Title IX reporting process, who “cannot themselves take corrective 
action” cannot be deemed appropriate persons.18 It did not say what 
kinds of corrective action must be within an appropriate person’s power, 
but one hypothetical implied that the power would lie with “a Dean of 
Students who is tasked with adjudicating student-conduct com-
plaints.”19 
Ross’s petition for certiorari is now pending before the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 20 The petition echoes the District Court’s opinion, 
providing that the Tenth Circuit’s holding “effectively creates a 
framework for schools and universities to insulate themselves from Title 
IX liability”21 and asking the Court to review the Tenth Circuit’s 
 
12. Ross, 859 F.3d at 1289–90. 
13. Campus Security, Univ. Tulsa, https://utulsa.edu/offices/campus-security/ 
[https://perma.cc/LAN6-A4MT] (last visited Feb. 25, 2018). 
14. Campus Safety Measures, Univ. Tulsa, https://utulsa.edu/offices/campus-
security/campus-safety-measures/ [https://perma.cc/HC2F-LJG2] (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2018). 
15. Ross, 859 F.3d at 1291. 
16. Ross, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 967. 
17. Ross, 859 F.3d at 1291–92. 
18. Id. at 1290. 
19. Id. 
20. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ross v. Univ. of Tulsa, No. 17-969, 2018 WL 
333856 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2018). 
21. Id. at 12. 
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application of the “appropriate person” test first announced in Gebser 
v. Lago Vista Independent School District.22  
The Court should grant the petition, but not on the questions 
presented. This Comment argues instead that both the District Court 
and the Tenth Circuit erred in applying the appropriate-person test at 
all. 
Part I analyzes Gebser and Davis v. Monroe County Board of 
Education, 23 the landmark cases giving rise to the private cause of 
action under Title IX for sexual harassment, and the differing 
approaches the Court took in laying out the elements of those claims 
in cases involving teacher-harassers and student-harassers. 
Part II discusses the development of the case law in the circuit 
courts since Davis and the extent to which courts have treated Davis 
either as a mere extension of Gebser or as establishing an independent 
test for liability in peer-harassment cases. 
Part III argues that the Supreme Court should intervene to clarify 
the law in this area. Such a decision would at once resolve the split 
among circuits, bolster the public policy embodied in Title IX, and ad-
dress the inequitable consequences for students who attend schools that 
lure them into reliance on a robust Title IX process that, in fact, does 
not exist. 
Part IV lays out the problems with applying the appropriate-person 
test to peer-harassment cases, using a collegiate athletic coach as a case 
study. 
Finally, Part V proposes that the Court clarify the proper approach 
for peer-harassment cases either by explicitly disclaiming the 
applicability of the appropriate-person test or by establishing a 
presumption that school employees are appropriate persons. 
I. Gebser and Davis 
The “appropriate person” requirement was born as part of the 
Supreme Court’s actual-notice test in Gebser. In that case, a mother 
brought a Title IX hostile-environment claim against the school district 
after discovering that her daughter was involved in a sexual relationship 
with one of her teachers.24 A district court granted summary judgment 
for the school district, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that 
agency principles were not appropriate for determining whether an 
 
22. 524 U.S. 274 (1998); see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 20, at i 
(citing Gebser, 524 U.S. 274 (1998)). 
23. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
24. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 278–79. 
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employee’s harassment of a student should subject a school to a private 
cause of action for monetary damages under Title IX.25 
The school district received reports that the teacher had made sex 
jokes in class, but the Court held that that was insufficient to put it on 
notice that the teacher was also having sex with a student.26 Instead, 
holding a district liable would require proof that an appropriate 
person—“an official who at a minimum has authority to address the 
alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the 
recipient’s behalf”—knew of the threat to students and responded with 
deliberate indifference that effectively permitted the harassment to 
continue and deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of her education.27 
Because the report of sex jokes said nothing about the possibility of a 
sexual relationship, the Court affirmed summary judgment, but it left 
unaddressed the question of whether the school principal who took 
those reports was an appropriate person. 
Less than a year later, the Court in Davis said that harassment by 
a student, rather than a teacher, could also give rise to the implied 
private cause of action permitted in Gebser.28 Davis involved a student 
whose classmate was permitted to continue groping her and harassing 
other students despite their repeated complaints to teachers and the 
principal. A district court dismissed the case, saying that peer 
harassment could not support a Title IX claim, but the Supreme Court 
re-versed, holding that deliberate indifference to harassment by peers 
could just as well support a Title IX claim.29 
But its decision made no mention of the “appropriate person” test. 
Had it intended to apply that test to such cases, the circumstances of 
the case suggest that it would have done so; the omission came despite 
the fact that the lower courts had never applied the test or offered even 
a conclusory statement that an appropriate person knew of the 
harassment, despite the fact that the highest-ranking employee with 
notice was again a school principal, whose appropriateness the Court 
 
25. Id. at 283, 292; see also Davis, 526 U.S. at 643 (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 
283) (“[I]n Gebser we expressly rejected the use of agency principles in the 
Title IX context . . . .”). 
26. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291. 
27. Id. at 290. 
28. Davis, 526 U.S. at 643. 
29. Id. (“We consider here whether the misconduct identified in Gebser—
deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment—amounts to an 
intentional violation of Title IX, capable of supporting a private damages 
action, when the harasser is a student rather than a teacher. We conclude 
that . . . it does.”). 
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had not directly addressed in Gebser, and despite the fact that at least 
one amicus had raised the issue.30 
Instead, the Davis Court’s discussion of the Gebser framework 
repeatedly emphasized that the appropriate-person analysis was a test 
to be applied to cases of misconduct by employees: 
“[W]e rejected the use of agency principles to impute liability to 
the district for the misconduct of its teachers.”31 
“[T]he district could be liable for damages only where the district 
itself intentionally acted in clear violation of Title IX by 
remaining deliberately indifferent to acts of teacher-student 
harassment . . . .”32 
“The high standard imposed in Gebser sought to eliminate any 
‘risk that the recipient would be liable in damages not for its own 
official decision but instead for its employees’ independent 
actions.’”33 
“Gebser thus established that a recipient intentionally violates 
Title IX, and is subject to a private damages action, where the 
recipient is deliberately indifferent to known acts of teacher-
student discrimination.”34 
“The fact that it was a teacher who engaged in harassment 
in . . . Gebser is relevant.”35 
The Court reiterated Gebser’s rejection of agency principles and its 
requirement of actual notice, but it saw no need to trifle over the precise 
scope of authority conferred on whomever a student reports peer 
harassment to. Instead, it recognized schools’ broad authority to 
regulate the conduct of their students—established through common 
law and Court precedent—as the basis for a different standard in cases 
of student-on-student harassment.36 In those cases, it said, schools can 
 
30. Brief of Amici Curiae National School Boards Association et al. in Support 
of Respondent, Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (No. 97-
843), 1998 WL 847120, at *19. 
31. Davis, 526 U.S. at 642 (emphasis added) (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283). 
32. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290). 
33. Id. at 643 (emphasis added) (quoting Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290–91). 
34. Id. (emphasis added). 
35. Id. at 653. 
36. Id. at 646 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 507 (1969); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.9 (1985); Davis 
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be held liable for subjecting students to harassment “where the recipient 
is deliberately indifferent to known acts of student-on-student sexual 
harassment and the harasser is under the school’s disciplinary 
authority.”37 The Court did not explicitly hold that the appropriate-
person test does not apply to student-on-student harassment cases, but 
its approach effectively acknowledged that when the offending party is 
a student, virtually any employee can be presumed to have authority 
to take some corrective action. 
The Court made no mention of an appropriate-person requirement 
in its only subsequent student-on-student harassment case.38 
II. Post-Davis Case Law 
For the most part, the circuit courts have followed the Court’s lead. 
Of the thirteen circuit courts, only two—the Tenth and the Eleventh—
have ever applied the appropriate-person test to a case of peer 
harassment, whether in the Title IX context or in Title VI or 
Rehabilitation Act cases, which often follow a parallel analysis.39 The 
distinction between the Gebser and Davis tests is plain enough that the 
courts have rarely even remarked on it, let alone struggled to apply it. 
A. The Majority Rule: Appropriate-Person Analysis Is Inapplicable to 
Peer-Harassment Claims 
The experience in the Sixth Circuit is generally representative of 
those in other circuits. The court has never imposed an appropriate-
person requirement in any of its student-on-student harassment cases. 
It did briefly acknowledge, in Vance v. Spencer Community Public 
School District,40 a difference between the tests for cases of harassment 
by teachers and by students, but it did not go so far as to explicitly 
delineate those differences. In Vance, a student won a jury verdict in a 
Title IX claim alleging that teachers and principals ignored her com-
plaints about harassment from other students over the course of several 
 
v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1193 (11th Cir. 1996); 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 152 (Am. Law Inst. 1965)). 
37. Davis, 526 U.S. at 647. 
38. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009). 
39. Davis, 526 U.S. at 643; Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 
283 (1998). The author’s review of peer-harassment cases published on 
Westlaw that cite Davis and include the phrase “appropriate person” 
revealed no cases published in the remaining eleven circuit courts.  
40. Vance v. Spencer Cty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 264 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(“We find that the slight nuances between the Davis standard and the jury 
instructions [including the appropriate-person test] were neither confusing, 
misleading, nor prejudicial.”). 
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years.41 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that Davis 
required evidence of only three facts, all of which Vance had satisfied: 
(1) harassment so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it 
can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational 
opportunities or benefits provided by the school; (2) actual knowledge 
of the harassment; and (3) deliberate indifference to the harassment. 
The court said the actual-knowledge requirement had been satisfied by 
com-plaints to a teacher and principal, without any inquiry into what 
authority either person possessed to take corrective measures to end the 
discrimination.42 
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged a wrinkle in the District Court’s 
jury instructions, which had told jurors that before they could find de-
liberate indifference on the part of the school district, “the plaintiff 
must prove that . . . the appropriate person decided to act or not to 
act in spite of that knowledge [of danger to the plaintiff].”43 While the 
Sixth Circuit said such instructions “differ from the standard the 
Supreme Court announced in Davis,” the school district had not 
disputed its knowledge of the harassment, and the court found that the 
instructions “were neither confusing, misleading, nor prejudicial.”44 The 
court did not explicitly disclaim the appropriate-person test, but it has 
never applied it in any of the dozen peer-harassment cases it has decided 
since Davis.45 
Because there is little explanation from these decisions as to why 
they are spending so little time—if any at all—on a question that 
frequently disposes of cases involving employee harassers, we can infer 
that they are making the distinction between the two types of cases. 
 
41. Id. at 256. 
42. Id. at 259 (“In this case, it is undisputed that Spencer had actual knowledge. 
Both Alma and her mother made repeated reports to Spencer. Alma 
informed both her teachers and principals.”). 
43. Id. at 263−64. 
44. Id. at 264. 
45. M.D. ex rel. Deweese v. Bowling Green Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 17-5248, 2017 
WL 4461055 (6th Cir. Oct. 6, 2017); Tumminello v. Father Ryan High Sch., 
Inc., 678 F. App’x 281 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 121 (2017); 
Stiles ex rel. D.S. v. Grainger Cty., Tenn., 819 F.3d 834, 848 (6th Cir. 2016); 
Shively v. Green Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 579 F. App’x 348 (6th Cir. 
2014) (mentioning the “authority to take corrective action” requirement 
without actually applying it); Pahssen v. Merrill Cmty. Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 
356 (6th Cir. 2012); Williams v. Port Huron Sch. Dist., 455 F. App’x 612 
(6th Cir. 2012); Patterson v. Hudson Area Sch., 551 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2009); 
S.S. v. E. Ky. Univ., 532 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2008); Winzer v. Sch. Dist. for 
City of Pontiac, 105 F. App’x 679 (6th Cir. 2004); Wayne v. Shadowen, 15 
F. App’x. 271 (6th Cir. 2001); Vance, 231 F.3d at 264; Soper v. Hoben, 195 
F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 1999). 
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Among the lower courts, though, there appears to be more 
confusion. In the Northern and Southern Districts of Ohio, for instance, 
there has been an “appropriate person” inquiry in a few peer-
harassment cases.46 In none of those cases, though, was the test a 
substantial barrier; the court either gave the question no real treatment, 
or it deemed actual knowledge of teachers and principals sufficient to 
move the case forward. Several other courts around the Sixth Circuit 
have gone deeper into the appropriate-person analysis in peer-
harassment cases, with mixed results.47 
 
46. Fulton v. W. Brown Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:15-CV-53, 2016 
WL 6893845, at *1, *7 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 23, 2016) (applying the appropriate-
person test in a Title VI context); Galloway v. Chesapeake Union Exempted 
Vill. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:11-CV-850, 2012 WL 5268946, at *1, *8–9 
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2012) (mentioning but not applying the appropriate-
person requirement); Logan v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:09-
CV-00885, 2012 WL 2011037, at *1, *5 (S.D. Ohio June 5, 2012) (finding 
material factual dispute as to whether principal and teacher were appropriate 
persons); Evans v. Bd. of Educ. Sw. City Sch. Dist., No. 2:08-CV-794, 2010 
WL 2889100, at *1, *8 (S.D. Ohio July 20, 2010), aff’d in part, 425 F. App’x 
432, 439 (6th Cir. 2011) (mentioning but not applying the appropriate-
person test); Schroeder ex rel. Schroeder v. Maumee Bd. of Educ., 296 F. 
Supp. 2d 869, 880 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (“Title IX imposes liability when ‘an 
official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination 
and to institute corrective measures on the recipient’s behalf has actual 
knowledge of discrimination in the recipient’s programs and fails to 
respond.’”) (quoting Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 
276 (1998)). But see Vidovic v. Mentor City Sch. Dist., 921 F. Supp. 2d 775 
(N.D. Ohio 2013) (failing to inquire whether a guidance counselor was 
appropriate person); Shively v. Green Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 
5:11CV2398, 2013 WL 774643 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part and remanded, 579 F. App’x 348 (6th Cir. 2014) (making no inquiry 
into who received the complaints). 
47. See, e.g., M.D. v. Bowling Green Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 1:15-CV-00014-GNS-
HBB, 2017 WL 390280, at *6 n.2 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 27, 2017), aff’d sub nom. 
M.D. ex rel. Deweese v. Bowling Green Indep. Sch. Dist., 709 Fed. Appx. 
775, 779 (6th Cir. 2017) (finding that a principal is an appropriate person); 
Hill v. Blount Cty. Bd. of Educ., 203 F. Supp. 3d 871, 883 (E.D. Tenn. 2016) 
(assuming that an assistant principal is an appropriate person); Patterson v. 
Hudson Area Sch., No. 05-74439, 2007 WL 4201137, *6 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 
27, 2007) rev’d and remanded, 551 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2009) (imposing the 
appropriate-person requirement but not applying it); Lopez v. Metro. Gov’t 
of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 646 F. Supp. 2d 891, 916 (M.D. Tenn. 2009) 
(finding bus drivers, teachers, and custodians are not appropriate persons); 
Staehling v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., No. 3:07-0797, 2008 
WL 4279839, *10 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 2008) (finding that a bus driver is 
not an appropriate person); Peer ex rel. Doe v. Porterfield, No. 1:05-CV-769, 
2007 WL 9655728, *9 n.5 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 8, 2007) (finding a school 
secretary is not an appropriate person). 
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These circumstances are mimicked throughout most of the country. 
In the First,48 Second,49 Third,50 Fourth,51 Fifth,52 Seventh,53 Eighth54 
and Ninth55 Circuits, none of the peer-harassment cases citing Davis 
have ever required a plaintiff to prove actual notice by an appropriate 
 
48. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165 (1st Cir. 2007), rev’d 
and remanded, 555 U.S. 246 (2009); Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 
67 (1st Cir. 2007). 
49. KF ex rel. CF v. Monroe Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist., 531 F. App’x 132 (2d 
Cir. 2013); Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d 655 (2d Cir. 2012); 
DiStiso v. Cook, 691 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2012); R.S. v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Hastings-On-Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 371 F. App’x 231 (2d Cir. 2010); 
DT v. Somers Cent. Sch. Dist., 348 F. App’x 697 (2d Cir. 2009); Doe v. E. 
Haven Bd. of Educ., 200 F. App’x 46 (2d Cir. 2006); Gant ex rel. Gant v. 
Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1999). 
50. L. L. v. Evesham Twp. Bd. of Educ., 710 F App’x 545 (3d Cir. 2017); Yan 
Yan v. Penn State Univ., 529 F. App’x 167 (3d Cir. 2013); Whitfield v. Notre 
Dame Middle Sch., 412 F. App’x 517 (3d Cir. 2011); DeJohn v. Temple 
Univ., 537 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2008); Doe v. Bellefonte Area Sch. Dist., 106 F. 
App’x 798 (3d Cir. 2004); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 
(3d Cir. 2001). 
51. S.B. ex rel. A.L. v. Bd. of Educ. of Harford Cty., 819 F.3d 69 (4th Cir. 2016); 
Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s Cty., 605 F. App’x 159 (4th Cir. 
2015); M.D. v. Sch. Bd. of City of Richmond, 560 F. App’x 199 (4th Cir. 
2014); Rouse v. Duke Univ., 535 F. App’x 289 (4th Cir. 2013); Stevenson ex 
rel. Stevenson v. Martin Cty. Bd. of Educ., 3 F. App’x 25 (4th Cir. 2001). 
52. Plummer v. Univ. of Houston, 860 F.3d 767 (5th Cir. June 23, 2017, revised 
June 26, 2017); K. S. v. Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist., 689 F. App’x 780 (5th Cir. 
2017); Fennell v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist., 804 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2015); 
Kelly v. Allen Indep. Sch. Dist., 602 F. App’x 949 (5th Cir. 2015); Estate of 
Lance v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 982 (5th Cir. 2014); 
Carmichael v. Galbraith, 574 F. App’x 286 (5th Cir. 2014); Sanches v. 
Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 2011); 
Watkins v. La Marque Indep. Sch. Dist., 308 F. App’x 781 (5th Cir. 2009); 
Bruce v. Wigley, 273 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2001). 
53. Doe v. Galster, 768 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2014); Davis v. Carmel Clay Sch., 570 
F. App’x 602 (7th Cir. 2014); Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chi. Heights, Ill. 
Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2003); Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. 
Dist., 282 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 2002); Adusumilli v. Ill. Inst. of Tech., 191 F.3d 
455 (7th Cir. 1999). 
54. Estate of Barnwell v. Watson, 880 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2018); K.T. v. Culver-
Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2017); Roe v. St. Louis Univ., 746 
F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2014); Wolfe v. Fayetteville, Arkansas Sch. Dist., 648 
F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2011); Ostrander v. Duggan, 341 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 2003). 
55. Al-Rifai v. Willows Unified Sch. Dist., 469 F. App’x 647 (9th Cir. 2012); Doe 
v. Univ. of Pac., 467 F. App’x 685 (9th Cir. 2012); M.L. v. Fed. Way Sch. 
Dist., 394 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2005); Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 
324 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2003); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 
F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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person, though some lower courts have spontaneously grafted that 
requirement into their peer-harassment analyses.56 
B. The Minority Rule: Liability for Peer Harassment Requires Notice to 
an Appropriate Person 
The situation is different in the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits. 
Neither one uniformly conducts an appropriate-person analysis, but 
both have applied it in some cases, including a few where it has barred 
recovery. In addition to the Ross decision discussed above, the Tenth 
Circuit reversed a decision holding that a victim of peer harassment 
 
56. E.M. ex rel. J.M. v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., No. A-17-CA-387 LY, 2018 
WL 627391, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2018) (“[A] counselor is not an 
‘appropriate person’ for notice purposes under Title IX.”); D.V. ex rel. B.V. 
v. Pennsauken Sch. Dist., 247 F. Supp. 3d 464, 475 (D.N.J. 2017) (“Nor is 
there evidence that the psychiatrist supervised or disciplined school 
personnel such that she was an ‘appropriate person’ who could subject the 
District to liability.”); Bittenbender ex rel. S.B. v. Bangor Area Sch. Dist., 
No. CV 15-6465, 2017 WL 1150642, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2017) (“[T]he 
plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded that an appropriate person was informed of 
the sexual harassment.”); Doe 1 v. Baylor Univ., 240 F. Supp. 3d 646, 659 
(W.D. Tex. 2017), motion to certify appeal denied, No. 6:16-CV-173-RP, 
2017 WL 1628994 (W.D. Tex. May 1, 2017) (“[T]he Court finds it plausible 
that personnel at [the campus police department and counseling 
center] . . . were ‘appropriate persons’ pursuant to Title IX.”); Krebs v. 
New Kensington-Arnold Sch. Dist., No. CV 16-610, 2016 WL 6820402, at *3 
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2016) (“The Krebs must plead . . . that [Plaintiffs] 
provided actual notice to “an appropriate person” who had authority to take 
corrective measures.”); Swanger v. Warrior Run Sch. Dist., 137 F.Supp. 3d 
737, 751 (M.D. Pa. 2015), vacated and remanded, 659 F. App’x 120 (3d Cir. 
2016) (“[A] plaintiff seeking recovery for a Title IX violation predicated on 
student-on-student sexual harassment must establish . . . [that] an 
‘appropriate person’ had actual knowledge of the alleged discrimination or 
harassment.”); Tyrrell v. Seaford Union Free Sch. Dist., No. CV-08-
4811(SJF)(MLO), 2010 WL 1257793, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2010), report 
and recommendation adopted, No. CV-08-4811(SJF)(MLO), 2010 WL 
1198055 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2010) (“[To establish] a violation of Title IX 
based on student-on-student harassment . . . an ‘appropriate person’ must 
have ‘actual knowledge’ of the alleged discrimination or harassment.”); 
McGrath v. Dominican Coll. of Blauvelt, N.Y., 672 F.Supp. 2d 477, 486 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[P]laintiff may recover for student on student harassment, 
if the plaintiff can demonstrate four elements . . . an appropriate person 
has actual knowledge of the discrimination or harassment.”); T.Z. v. City of 
New York, 634 F. Supp. 2d 263, 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[A]n appropriate 
person must have ‘actual knowledge’ of the alleged discrimination or 
harassment.”); Herndon v. Coll. of Mainland, No. G-06-0286, 2009 WL 
367500, at *14 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2009) (“To recover damages for an 
instructor’s sexual harassment of a student or for a student’s sexual 
harassment of another student, the plaintiff must show that 1) an 
‘appropriate person,’ i.e., an official or employee of the funding recipient with 
authority to take corrective action to end the discrimination; 2) had actual 
notice.”). 
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had failed to state a claim for relief, noting that it was bound to accept 
as true the complaint’s allegations that teachers had “the authority to 
halt Mr. Doe’s known sexually assaultive behavior” and were therefore 
appropriate persons to receive a report. 57  But that court has also 
decided several other peer-harassment cases in which it never inquired 
in-to whether an appropriate person was aware of harassment.58 
There is a similar split in authority in the Eleventh Circuit, which 
became the first to explicitly acknowledge the possible tension between 
the Davis and Gebser standards, noting that Davis “did not directly 
address who must have notice.”59 The court stated:  
With respect to harassment by teachers or staff, application of 
the Supreme Court’s requirement of actual notice to an official 
with authority to address the discrimination and to institute 
corrective measures results in a limited and readily identifiable 
number of school administrators. However, a much broader 
number of administrators and employees could conceivably 
exercise at least some control over student behavior.60 
Because the parties had not fully briefed the issue, the court instead 
rested the case on its finding that the harassment in question “was not 
so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it had the systemic 
effect of denying the girls equal access to education.”61 While the court 
indicated it was saving the “appropriate person” question for another 
day, it has never revisited it, nor has any other circuit. Since then, the 
 
57. Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 186 F.3d 1238, 1248 (10th Cir. 
1999). 
58. Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114 (10th 
Cir. 2008); Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 
2007); Bryant v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-38 of Garvin Cty., OK, 334 F.3d 
928 (10th Cir. 2003). 
59. Hawkins v. Sarasota Cty. Sch. Bd., 322 F.3d 1279, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 1288. 
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court has simply assumed—without explaining why—either that a peer-
harassment case requires proof of such notice62 or that it does not.63 
Neither the D.C. Circuit nor the Federal Circuit has applied Gebser 
or Davis to a case of peer harassment. 
III. The Shortcomings of Current Title IX 
Interpretations 
Most obvious among the reasons for the Court to grant certiorari 
in Ross is the circuit split that it crystallized. If it was not previously 
clear whether or how the Tenth Circuit intended to apply Gebser to 
cases of peer harassment, Ross makes plain that the Tenth Circuit is 
now willing to bar claims on a basis that only one other circuit has 
endorsed. Since before the court was constituted, resolving such 
geography-based discrepancies in how the courts treat otherwise 
similarly situated plaintiffs has been recognized as one of the primary 
justifications for a supreme court. 64  Beyond the consequences for 
national unity and uniformity, circuit splits such as this one impose 
additional hardships on the legal system by encouraging additional 
litigation, in-creasing compliance costs for entities operating in multiple 
jurisdictions, and undermining the perceived legitimacy of the law and 
judiciary.65 
 
62. Doe v. Bibb Cty. Sch. Dist., 688 F. App’x 791, 795 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he 
plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) the defendant is a Title IX funding 
recipient; (2) an ‘appropriate person’ had actual knowledge of the 
discrimination . . . .”); Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 970 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(“The second element requires Doe to prove an ‘appropriate person’ capable 
of putting the Board on notice had ‘actual knowledge’ of CJC’s sexual 
harassment and discrimination.”); Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. 
of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1294 (11th Cir. 2007) (“In the absence of any 
allegations that an appropriate person with the Board of Regents had actual 
knowledge of the acts that Williams alleges constitute discrimination, 
Williams’s Title IX claim against the Board of Regents cannot survive a 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”). 
63. Porter v. Duval Cty. Sch. Bd., 406 F. App’x 460 (11th Cir. 2010); Shotz v. 
City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 2003). 
64. The Federalist No. 80, at 475 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1966) (“Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same 
causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government, from which 
nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed.”). 
65. See generally Deborah Beim and Kelly Rader, Evolution of Conflict in the 
Courts of Appeals (May 12, 2015), https://cpb-us-west-2-juc1ugur1qwq 
qqo4.stackpathdns.com/campuspress.yale.edu/dist/6/356/files/2011/10/Bei
m_Rader_Conflicts-xxkfk0.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM6U-3BKU] (exploring 
the “life cycle” of an intercircuit split by analyzing an original dataset that 
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In this last respect the problem may be the most significant. The 
fact that cases are turning on whether women have successfully divined 
the “appropriate person” to whom they should report being raped, at-
tacked, or harassed, rather than whether that person took appropriate 
measures to remedy the situation, suggests that the system is not 
working as Congress intended when it enacted Title IX in recognition 
that sexual harassment “is reprehensible and undermines the basic 
purposes of the educational system.” 66  If one accepts the Court’s 
conclusion that Congress was contemplating an implied cause of 
action,67 it is hard to imagine that such an action was supposed to be 
available only to those who could navigate educational institutions’ 
often-byzantine hierarchies to determine which person, or group of 
persons, had adequate authority “to address the alleged discrimination 
and to institute corrective measures . . . .”68 
A. Title IX Is Not Achieving Its Goals Under the Court’s Current 
Interpretations 
The inadequacy of an interpretation that imposes such 
requirements only becomes clearer in light of the recent explosion of 
empirical and anecdotal evidence that sexual harassment is far more 
pervasive than generally acknowledged, and that it remains obscured 
in large part because of the often-insurmountable practical barriers to 
reporting it in a way that that will actually lead to meaningful changes. 
Thanks in large part to the #MeToo movement, the public and 
press are growing more attuned to the problem, as well as to the failures 
to seriously address it, especially in cases where harassers have some 
level of prestige at the institutions where they prey on their victims. 
The case of Larry Nassar—a member of Michigan State University’s 
medical faculty who sexually assaulted students and other girls 
numbering in the hundreds—has led to the resignation of the school’s 
president69 and athletic director,70 as well as the entire board of the 
 
comprises a sample of conflicts between Courts of Appeals that existed 
between 2005 and 2013). 
66. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292 (1998). 
67. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (“Title IX presents the 
atypical situation in which all of the circumstances that the Court has 
previously identified as supportive of an implied remedy are present.”). 
68. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. 
69. Julie Mack, Michigan State President Lou Anna Simon Resigns, Mlive 
(Jan. 24, 2018), http://www.mlive.com/news/index.ssf/2018/01/lou_anna_ 
k_simon_michigan_stat.html [https://perma.cc/9YA7-93X7]. 
70. Kyle Austin, Michigan State Athletic Director Mark Hollis Resigns Amid 
Larry Nassar Fallout, MLive (Jan. 26, 2018), http://www.mlive.com/ 
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national gymnastics governing board.71 At the University of Arizona, a 
track and field coach was fired after police picked him up on charges of 
assaulting and stalking one of his players after she accused him of 
attacking her with a box cutter in his office.72 Most infamously, the 
scandal at Penn State ended the careers of the university’s president, 
vice president, athletic director and football coach, all of whom 
participated in the cover-up of dozens of rapes perpetrated by assistant 
coach Jerry Sandusky.73 
Given the abuse of trust involved, these stories of faculty and staff 
members preying on students are often more shocking, but they can 
obscure the more common problem of sexual harassment and assault 
perpetrated against students by their fellow students. Research on the 
problem consistently shows that huge numbers of students are the 
victims of sexual harassment and assault, and that students are far 
more likely than faculty or staff to be the aggressor. The best available 
data suggests that roughly 20 percent74 to 30 percent75 of women are 
sexually assaulted during their time in college. The share of women who 
report being sexually harassed at school jumps to about two-thirds in 
 
spartans/index.ssf/2018/01/michigan_state_athletic_direct_12.html [https: 
//perma.cc/6Z8J-5DZX]. 
71. Matt Stevens, Remaining Members of U.S.A. Gymnastics Board to Resign 
After Nassar Scandal, N.Y. Times (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2018/01/26/sports/usa-gymnastics-board-nassar.html [https: 
//perma.cc/N6MG-Y7EW]. 
72. Caitlin Schmidt, ‘20/20’ to Air Special Tonight on Arizona Wildcats Coach 
Accused of Assault, Ariz. Daily Star (Nov. 10, 2017), http://tucson. 
com/news/local/to-air-special-tonight-on-arizona-wildcats-coach-accused-of/ 
article_7b567f6c-c624-11e7-b873-23887ccd16bd.html [https://perma.cc/N9A 
U-NJCU]. 
73. Carter Walker, Jurors Deadlocked in Spanier Trial; Deliberations Continue 
Friday, Morning Call (Mar. 23, 2017, 10:06 PM), http://www.mcall. 
com/news/breaking/mc-penn-state-abuse-trial-defense-0323-20170323-story. 
html [https://perma.cc/9ZR7-KMZN]. 
74. Nick Anderson & Scott Clement, 1 in 5 College Women Say They Were 
Violated, Wash. Post (June 12, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
sf/local/2015/06/12/1-in-5-women-say-they-were-violated/ [https://perma. 
cc/Y8QE-32MG]; Christopher P. Krebs et al., The Campus Sexual 
Assault Study 5-2 (2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/ 
221153.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQJ5-L2EF]. 
75. David Cantor et al., Report on the AAU Campus Climate Survey 
on Sexual Assault and Sexual Misconduct 148 (2015), http:// 
www.upenn.edu/ir/surveys/AAU/Report%20and%20Tables%20on%20AAU
%20Campus%20Climate%20Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HGN-YGZM].  
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college,76 and 56 percent in grades 7–12.77 As frequent as harassment is, 
though, it is almost exclusively perpetrated by peers, rather than school 
employees. Research on college harassment found that only 7 percent 
of harassed students were targeted by a professor, with an additional 
“small number” targeted by some other school employee.78 In grades 7–
12, the number of harassed students targeted by teachers or other 
employees drops to less than 1 percent.79 
As common as this problem is, it is obvious that there remain major 
barriers to eliminating it. Even with substantial majorities of women 
acknowledging in confidential surveys that they have been victims, 
numbers from individual schools suggest that sexual harassment and 
assault only happens somewhere else. While about one in four women 
reports being sexually assaulted in college, 91 percent of colleges re-
ported that there were zero rape reports—substantiated or otherwise—
anywhere on their campuses in 2014.80 The numbers are not much 
better in lower grades: with half of all students in grades 7–12 reporting 
that they have personally been victims of sexual harassment, more than 
two-thirds of public school systems reported that they fielded exactly 
zero reports of sexual harassment or bullying in 2014.81 
Some portion of that discrepancy is undoubtedly attributable to 
incidents that go unreported, but with research indicating that about 7 
percent of harassed college students 82  and 9 percent of harassed 
 
76. Catherine Hill & Elena Silva, Drawing the Line: Sexual 
Harassment on Campus 18 (2005), https://www.aauw.org/files/2013/ 
02/drawing-the-line-sexual-harassment-on-campus.pdf [https://perma.cc/B 
XC2-FPVC]; Harassment on College Campuses, Hollaback, https:// 
www.ihollaback.org/harassment-on-college-campuses/ [https://perma.cc/8J 
D5-FFGJ] (last visited March 28, 2018). 
77. Catherine Hill & Holly Kearl, Crossing the Line: Sexual 
Harassment at School 11 (2011), https://www.aauw.org/files/2013/ 
02/Crossing-the-Line-Sexual-Harassment-at-School.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
Q7ZX-WKGX]. 
78. Hill & Silva, supra note 76, at 21.  
79. Poom Nukulkij, Knowledge Networks Project Report 37 (2011), 
https://www.aauw.org/files/2013/02/crossing-the-line-harassment-at-school-
survey-methodology.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KEX-BCQE]. 
80. Amy Becker, 91 Percent of Colleges Reported Zero Incidents of Rape in 
2014, AAUW (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.aauw.org/article/clery-act-
data-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/LWC3-KFSG]. 
81. Erin Prangley, Two-Thirds of Public Schools Reported Zero Incidents of 
Sexual Harassment in 2013–14, AAUW (July 12, 2016), https://www. 
aauw.org/article/schools-report-zero-sexual-harassment/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4Y7M-4QRB]. 
82. Hill & Silva, supra note 76, at 32.  
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students in grades 7–1283 do tell some school employee, the schools 
them-selves apparently are not reporting all the incidents that their 
students report to them. Less clear is how much of that gap is due to 
failures in recordkeeping and how much is due to a deliberate effort to 
paint a rosier picture of campus life. 
In either case, victims can hardly be blamed for being less than 
enthusiastic about reporting. When recovering from often-humiliating 
psychological and physical attacks, it seems unlikely that anyone would 
be in any rush to enlist the aid of a bureaucracy that is either unable 
or unwilling to both admit and address the problem. The research bears 
this out, with harassed students saying that they do not report 
harassment to their schools because they believe that their reports are 
not serious enough for the school to take action, that reporting will not 
change anything, and that staff members may react negatively toward 
them. 84  A separate review of records from the Department of 
Education’s Office of Civil Rights, which is responsible for enforcing 
Title IX, reached similar conclusions, finding that actual and perceived 
failures to take sexual harassment seriously were a recurring theme 
among noncompliant schools, with schools tacitly and sometimes 
explicitly discouraging victims from triggering investigations.85 
Title IX and its accompanying regulations were supposed to address 
this problem, in part by requiring schools to “designate at least one 
employee to coordinate its efforts to comply with and carry out its 
responsibilities under this part, including any investigation of any com-
plaint . . . alleging any actions which would be prohibited by this 
part.”86 Even though schools are required to “notify all [their] students 
and employees of the name, office address and telephone number of the 
employee or employees appointed pursuant to this paragraph,”87 this 
information is not getting through to the students who are being 
harassed. Nearly half of all college students surveyed did not know 
whether their schools had any such person, and nearly three-quarters 
of college students who filed harassment reports could not say whether 
the person they talked to was their school’s Title IX coordinator.88 
 
83. Hill & Keale, supra note 77, at 2. 
84. Id. at 27; Hill & Silva, supra note 76, at 33.  
85. Lenore Schaffer nee Malone, Understanding Noncompliance: A Qualitative 
Content Analysis of Title IX Sexual Misconduct Violations Using the Office 
for Civil Rights Investigative Findings 92–104 (May 2017) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern Mississippi), http://aquila.usm. 
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2414&context=dissertations [https://perma. 
cc/8G9R-DVQ6]. 
86. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a). 
87. Id. 
88. Hill & Silva, supra note 76, at 35.  
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Facing these numbers, it is hard to see how the Tenth Circuit, or 
any other court can purport to advance the purposes of Title IX by 
imposing highly technical requirements on students who have been 
thrust into an already-complex and often overtly hostile system at the 
most vulnerable time in their lives. The Supreme Court needs to step 
in to correct this error. 
B. The Inequitable Results of the Appropriate-Person Test 
Even if the Court were to impose an appropriate-person 
requirement in peer-harassment cases, it should—at a bare minimum—
hold that a school has actual notice when a student reports harassment 
to someone the school itself has assured students will take corrective 
action. 
In a footnote to Massey v. Akron City Board of Education,89 one 
judge remarked that besides actual notice to an appropriate person, the 
Gebser standard is also satisfied “when notice is given to any employee 
whom the school has designated to respond to harassment com-
plaints.” 90  Although that conclusion may seem at first blush 
inconsistent with Gebser, it has slowly spread across the country, with 
courts recognizing the inequity inherent in the alternative, which would 
permit schools to shield themselves from liability by holding out the 
promise of corrective action without ever actually following through on 
those promises.91 
This was the basic premise of the District Court’s appropriate-per-
son analysis in Ross, which the Tenth Circuit reversed without ad-
dressing, and it has been picked up in a variety of other decisions, as 
well. Most recent was Wilborn v. South Union State Community 
College,92 where the only woman at a truck-driving school brought a 
Title IX claim based on her experience in a program that initially 
rejected her because she belonged “at home making babies instead of 
trying to drive a truck.”93 She reported discrimination and harassment 
to the program manager in accordance with the school’s grievance 
policy; the program manager was in turn required to pass on the report 
to someone who could initiate corrective measures. Despite the school’s 
claims that the director had no actual authority to discipline the 
 
89. 82 F. Supp. 2d 735 (N.D. Ohio 2000). 
90. Massey, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 744 n.7. 
91. Yog v. Tex. S. Univ., No. H-08-3034, 2010 WL 4053706, at *4 (S.D. Tex. 
Oct. 14, 2010) (citing Massey, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 744 n.7); Doe v. Farmer, 
No. 3:06-0202, 2009 WL 3768906, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 9, 2009). 
92. 720 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (M.D. Ala. 2010). 
93. Id. at 1287 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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offending employees, the court held that the school could not require 
students to use a sham reporting procedure.94 
The logic of that approach seems to have broad appeal and has 
been endorsed in several other decisions.95 
IV. Why Appropriate-Person Analysis Doesn’t Work 
The Tenth Circuit’s hyper-fastidious inquiry into the precise 
boundaries of a police force’s authority—facts likely subject to judicial 
notice in most cases—highlights the potential for the appropriate-
person test to undermine the public policy embodied in Title IX. 
Strictly enforcing the appropriate-person test may be justifiable in 
the context of harassment by teachers or other staff; a subordinate who 
knows that someone in his chain of command is harassing students is 
not empowered to separate the two or impose any discipline on the 
offender—though he is obviously able to report to someone who is. The 
good news for the victims of peer harassment is that—unlike in cases 
involving employees, who are more likely to be protected by tenure, 
collective bargaining agreements or employment contracts—schools 
have “comprehensive authority . . . to prescribe and control conduct 
in the schools.”96 The fact of schools’ ability to discipline their students 
 
94. Id. at 1306. (“[A] recipient of federal funds should not be able to construct a 
grievance procedure so as to shield itself from Title IX liability.”). 
95. See, e.g., Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 243 (4th Cir. 2001) (Michael, 
J., dissenting) (“Because [the principal] was the supervisor of the school and 
the official designated to receive complaints about sexual assaults, the school 
board should not be able to avoid liability for [his] deliberate indifference to 
a known risk of teacher-on-student sexual abuse.”); Yog, 2010 WL 4053706, 
at *4 (rejecting contention that “notice to an official who the defendant 
school has designated to serve as its ‘compliance manager’ is not also 
sufficient to satisfy Title IX’s notice requirements”); Doe, 2009 WL 3768906, 
at *8 (holding that “responsibility under the school district’s policy to receive 
allegations of sexual abuse” rendered principal an appropriate person); Roe 
ex rel. Callahan v. Gustine Unified Sch. Dist., 678 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1030 
(E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Doe, 2009 WL 3768906, at *9 (holding that 
“responsibility under the school district’s policy to receive allegations of 
sexual abuse” rendered principal an appropriate person)). But see Douglas 
v. Brookville Area Sch. Dist., 836 F. Supp. 2d 329, 360 n.14 (W.D. Pa. 2011) 
(finding that such an approach “would cause liability under Title IX to 
collapse into something akin to respondeat superior liability”); Ross v. Univ. 
of Tulsa, 859 F.3d 1280, 1291–92 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding that policy 
requiring employees to “begin the university’s ‘corrective processes’” was 
insufficient to render them appropriate persons). 
96. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 646 (1999) (quoting Tinker 
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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“during school hours and on school grounds” 97  is generally 
unobjectionable, and it appears to have greatly simplified the Court’s 
analysis of whether to award money damages against recipients of Title 
IX funding when the U.S. Supreme Court first took up the question of 
peer harassment in Davis. 
To provide more useful guidance to that effect, the Court should 
clarify what it means by corrective action and why virtually any school 
employee can be presumed to have authority to implement it in cases 
of peer harassment. 
A. What Is Corrective Action? 
Courts recognize that determining whether an official is an 
“appropriate person” is “necessarily a fact-based inquiry.”98 Because the 
same job title may carry different job responsibilities from one school 
to the next, courts have consistently refused to “name job titles that 
would or would not adequately satisfy this requirement.”99 But before 
answering whether an individual has the authority to take corrective 
action, one must know what “corrective action” actually means. The 
term could refer merely to actions taken to punish harassment, or it 
could refer to efforts to ensure the victim can enjoy the benefits of an 
education de-spite the harassment. 
1. Corrective Action Means More Than Swift and Severe Punishment 
Some courts have taken the narrow approach, asking only whether 
an official has the authority to punish the harasser.100 But others have 
taken a more holistic approach, finding that corrective action can also 
be focused on victims.101 The latter approach is more consistent with 
 
97. Id. 
98. Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 186 F.3d 1238, 1247 (10th Cir. 
1999). 
99. Id. 
100. Baynard, 268 F.3d at 239 (holding an appropriate person must have 
“independent authority to suspend, reassign, or terminate” an offending 
employee); Blue v. D.C., 850 F. Supp. 2d 16, 34 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, 811 
F.3d 14 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“‘[A]uthority to take corrective action’ means the 
ability to fire or discipline the teacher in question.”). 
101. See Waters v. Drake, 222 F. Supp. 3d 582, 595 (S.D. Ohio 2016), appeal 
dismissed, No. 16-4043, 2016 WL 9665545 (6th Cir. Dec. 27, 2016) (“The 
corrective action included strengthening the Band’s leadership, updating the 
Band’s policies and procedures to ensure Title IX compliance, training Band 
staff on Title IX issues, providing counseling for victims of sexual 
harassment, distributing written materials on sexual harassment and sexual 
violence to Band staff and members, and conducting assessments of the 
effectiveness of efforts to change the Band’s culture.”); J.K. v. Ariz. Bd. of 
Regents, No. CV06-916-PHX-MHM, 2008 WL 4446712, at *13 (D. Ariz. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 4·2018 
No One Is an Inappropriate Person 
1363 
Department of Education guidance, which explicitly calls for steps be-
yond disciplining the offending party to “eliminate the hostile 
environment, prevent its recurrence, and, as appropriate, remedy its 
effects.”102 
The Court has signaled the importance of these regulations in 
determining the scope of liability under Title IX, pointing specifically 
to 34 C.F.R. § 106.3, the Department of Education’s regulation 
requiring schools to identify past and present discriminatory practices 
and implement remedial measures to eliminate their discriminatory 
effects. 103  That mandate stands in stark contrast with the Tenth 
Circuit’s rationale in Ross, which appears to be focused almost 
exclusively on punitive measures.104 But the Supreme Court has rejected 
an approach that insists on “expulsion of every student accused of 
misconduct involving sexual overtones” or that makes “particular 
remedial demands.”105 
Instead, administrators are only required to respond to complaints 
“in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable.”106 In Gebser, for in-
stance, the Court took no exception when a principal who received re-
ports of a teacher’s off-color jokes merely cautioned the teacher “to be 
careful about his classroom comments.”107 And in Davis, it signaled that 
the school may have responded adequately to complaints of sexual 
harassment by merely threatening to discipline the offender.108 
So understood, the universe of school employees with the power to 
take corrective action becomes far larger than the Tenth Circuit ac-
knowledges. If, as was the case in Ross, the school concludes that no 
offense or only a de minimis offense had been committed, it would of 
course have been within the power of campus police to administer a 
 
Sept. 30, 2008) (mentioning that the corrective action included a 
“report . . . to Judicial Affairs for possible Code of Conduct violations.”). 
102. Dept. of Ed., Office of Civil Rights, Questions and Answers on 
Title IX and Sexual Violence 2–3, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/ 
list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf [perma.cc/NLJ7-HHX7]. 
103. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 288 (1998) (“In the 
event of a violation, a funding recipient may be required to take ‘such 
remedial action as [is] deem[ed] necessary to overcome the effects of [the] 
discrimination.’”) (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(a) (2017)).  
104. See supra notes 1–18 and accompanying text.   
105. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999). 
106. Id. at 649. 
107. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 278. 
108. Davis, 526 U.S. at 649 (“[I]t remains to be seen whether petitioner can show 
that the Board’s response to reports of G.F.’s misconduct was clearly 
unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.”). 
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verbal warning to the accused rapist or to counsel him on the potential 
for more serious consequences that could come from failing to secure 
affirmative consent before having sex. 
2. Corrective Action Includes Remedial Measures to Benefit the Victim 
More importantly, the Tenth Circuit’s narrow definition of 
corrective action appears to come from a misconception of the action 
to be corrected. In a criminal context, a student reporting sexual assault 
is seeking to have the assault punished, so the punishment is an 
appropriate way to evaluate the response. But Title IX does not, strictly 
speaking, provide a remedy for people who have been harassed or 
assaulted; more precisely, it provides a remedy for people who, based 
on their sex, have been excluded from participating in an educational 
program, who have been denied its benefits, or who have been subjected 
to discrimination.109 
“Corrective action,” therefore, hardly needs to be limited to 
disciplinary action targeting the offender; instead, it may be more 
appropriately focused on the victim. If the school can take action to 
ensure that a victim continues to enjoy the full benefits of her 
education, de-spite having been harassed or assaulted, any action it 
takes to that end would constitute corrective action. Properly refocused 
on this question, courts should have little difficulty finding that any 
given school employee has the power to take corrective action that is 
“not clearly un-reasonable.” 110  Depending on the severity of the 
incident, it may be enough for a school to take corrective action by 
talking to the victim, by referring her to counselors or police, by 
notifying her of her rights under Title IX, or by personally requesting 
that the Title IX office initiate a formal investigation. Even in more 
severe cases, similar re-medial measures directed at the perpetrator—
referring him to counseling or for some other intervention, for 
instance—may also be adequate. If any of these were reasonably 
calculated to ensure that the incident did not derail the victim’s 
education or the education of any future victim, they could be enough 
to survive a court’s scrutiny. 
Title IX certainly does not suggest that offenders should not be 
punished for creating a hostile environment, but its implementation has 
consistently focused more heavily on taking actions on behalf of the 
 
109. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2016). The Supreme Court has already recognized an 
analogous principle in the Title VII context. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (“[N]ot all workplace conduct that may be 
described as ‘harassment’ affects a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of 
employment within the meaning of Title VII. . . . For sexual harassment 
to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive . . . .”) (citing 
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (1972)). 
110. Davis, 526 U.S. at 649. 
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students whom that environment has denied the benefit of their 
education. Guidance from the Department of Education’s Office of Civil 
Rights (“OCR”) breaks this requirement into three separate categories: 
First, to “eliminate any hostile environment that has been created,” 
OCR recommends requiring the harasser to apologize to the harassed 
student, assisting the harassed student in making schedule changes to 
avoid a hostile environment, and communicating to students that such 
harassment will not be tolerated.111 Second, to “address the effects of 
the harassment,” it suggests providing tutoring, tuition adjustments, or 
professional counseling.112 Finally, to “prevent any further harassment,” 
the guidance recommends ensuring that the harassed student under-
stands how to report further problems, counseling her to ensure she 
understands the full scope of prohibited conduct, checking in to see if 
any more harassment has occurred, and providing similar services to 
other students to ensure that the problem is not more widespread.113 
B. The Collegiate Athletic Coach: A Case Study 
To illustrate the breadth of school employees’ authority to 
implement OCR-prescribed corrective measures, consider the example 
of an athletic coach at a large state school. Colleges have considerably 
less authority over their students than they would if they were charged 
with educating small children. 114  And governed as they are by 
constitutional restraints, state schools have even less authority than 
their private counterparts.115 Despite these limitations, even a state-
school coach who learned that one of her athletes was being sexually 
harassed or had been sexually assaulted would continue to wield 
considerable authority to implement corrective measures on all three 
dimensions in the OCR guidance discussed above. 
 
111. Office of Civil Rights, Dep’t of Educ., Revised Sexual 
Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School 
Employees, Other Student, or Third Parties 16 (2001). 
112. Id. at 16–17. 
113. Id. at 17. 
114. Davis, 526 U.S. at 646 (“[T]he nature of [the State’s] power [over public 
schoolchildren] is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision 
and control that could not be exercised over free adults.”) (quoting Vernonia 
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995)). 
115. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (“[Having] created a forum 
generally open for use by student groups . . . the University has assumed 
an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable 
constitutional norms.”). 
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1. Courts Generally Accept Coaches as Appropriate Persons in Peer-
Harassment Cases 
There is no reason to think that a coach cannot be an appropriate 
person simply because she was not the president of the university or 
the full-time Title IX coordinator, as some cases have seemed to 
demand. Consistent with the general reluctance to attach appropriate-
person status to any given job title, courts have not made any definitive 
pronouncements that coaches are or are not appropriate persons, 
though several cases have examined the question. 
In Kinsman v. Florida State University Board of Trustees,116 a 
student alleged a Title IX violation after a football player raped her 
and the school failed to investigate.117 The trial court denied a motion 
to dismiss, holding that because determining who is an appropriate per-
son is “a fact-based inquiry,” it could not hold as a matter of law that 
neither a football coach nor an associate athletic director was an 
appropriate person.118 It recognized that the facts may “show that one 
or both of these officials had enough authority over a member of the 
foot-ball team to take corrective action.”119 
In Roe ex rel. Callahan v. Gustine Unified School District,120 a 
football player alleged a Title IX violation based on sexual harassment 
he endured at a football camp.121 The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that it could not conclude 
as a matter of law that the football coach was not an appropriate per-
son.122 The court pointed to several facts indicating that the coach had 
sufficiently substantial control, noting that he had formulated all 
aspects of the football camp and football program, was chief 
administrator and disciplinary authority for the football program, had 
acted as administrative proxy between the program and the school 
district, had determined eligibility criteria, was responsible for athletes 
“on and off the field,” and was considered “school personnel in charge” 
to whom inappropriate behavior should be reported.123 
 
116. No. 4:15CV235-MW/CAS, 2015 WL 11110848 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2015). 
117. Id. at *2.  
118. Id. (quoting Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., Fla., 604 F.3d 1248, 1256 
(11th Cir. 2010)).  
119. Id.  
120. 678 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
121. Id. at 1011. 
122. Id. at 1033–34.  
123. Id. at 1034. 
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In Doe ex rel. Conner v. Unified School District 233,124 a student 
alleged a Title IX violation based on harassment from fellow students.125 
Although the court granted summary judgment for the defendants, its 
analysis concluded that the plaintiff had notified an appropriate person 
when he talked to a teacher and track coach.126 Relying on a previously 
established presumption that teachers have authority to take corrective 
action against peer-to-peer harassment during the school day on school 
grounds, the court noted that Doe had complained to a track coach at 
track practice on school grounds—“similar enough for the court to 
presume [the coach] had the requisite control to take corrective 
measures.”127 
S.S. v. Alexander128 appears to have come the closest to directly 
answering the question. There, an assistant equipment manager for the 
University of Washington football team brought a Title IX complaint 
after being raped by a football player and watching her complaints go 
unaddressed by a series of school employees of escalating authority.129 
The Washington Court of Appeals held that the equipment manager 
and an assistant football coach were not appropriate persons because 
their “duties are at a lower level, more akin to a classroom instructor.”130 
But it held that an assistant athletic director and associate athletic 
director were appropriate persons because each “holds an 
administrative position involving the exercise of significant discretion 
and each plainly had the authority to ‘institute corrective measures’”131 
and was “in a position to exercise control over the harasser and the 
context in which the harassment took place.”132 The head coach was 
apparently never notified, so there was no holding on whether he would 
have qualified.133 
Some courts have rejected coaches as appropriate persons, but those 
instances appear to be limited to cases of harassment by employees. In 
Najera v. Independent School District of Stroud No. I-54 of Lincoln 
 
124. No. 12-2285-JTM, 2013 WL 3984336 (D. Kan. Aug. 1, 2013). 
125. Id. at *1, *3.  
126. Id. at *5, *8. 
127. Id. at *5. 
128. 177 P.3d 724 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). 
129. Id. at 728. 
130. Id. at 738. 
131. Id. (quoting Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 
(1998)). 
132. Id. (citing Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645 (1999)). 
133. Id. at 729.  
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County,134 a parent alleged a Title IX violation based on her daughter’s 
interactions with a school employee whose husband and father—both 
teachers and coaches for the school district themselves—were aware of 
the relationship.135 The court granted summary judgment for the school 
for any harassment that occurred while they were the only ones who 
knew of it, saying that there was no evidence that either of them had 
any authority to take corrective action.136 
And in Doe No. 1 v. Boulder Valley School District No. Re-2,137 a 
group of high school students alleged Title IX violations based on sexual 
harassment by a wrestling coach.138 The court granted a motion to dis-
miss, holding that no appropriate person was aware of the 
harassment.139 The case presented a strange fact pattern in which the 
harasser, Travis Masse, was initially a volunteer assistant coach for the 
Boulder Valley School District while working on his education degree 
and doing a field placement in another school district.140 That district 
informed Mark Schmidt, Boulder Valley’s head wrestling coach, that 
Masse had been harassing girls, but Schmidt retained Masse.141 After 
Masse landed a full-time teaching job with Boulder Valley, he and 
Schmidt swapped positions in the wrestling program, with Masse be-
coming head coach and Schmidt becoming an assistant.142 While the 
court seemed to allow for the possibility that a wrestling coach could 
be an appropriate person, it said that Schmidt was not because Masse’s 
harassment of the plaintiffs in this case came after Masse’s promotion.143 
Given his position as a subordinate, the court said, “[t]here is no 
plausible allegation that he had any authority to address the alleged 
dis-crimination and take corrective action.”144 
The general consensus that a coach may be an appropriate person 
in the context of peer-harassment cases is only reinforced by the 
Supreme Court’s observations on the special significance of coaches in 
 
134. No. CIV-14-657-R, 2015 WL 4310552 (W.D. Okla. July 14, 2015). 
135. Id. at *1.   
136. Id. at *2. 
137. No. 11-CV-02107-PAB-KLM, 2012 WL 4378162 (D. Colo. Sept. 25, 2012), 
aff’d, 523 F. App’x 514 (10th Cir. 2013). 
138. Id. at *1–2.  
139. Id. at *5.  
140. Id. at *1.  
141. Id. 
142. Id. at *1–2. 
143. Id. at *4 n.2.  
144. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 4·2018 
No One Is an Inappropriate Person 
1369 
the context of addressing Title IX violations, saying they “are often in 
the best position to vindicate the rights of their students because they 
are better able to identify discrimination and bring it to the attention 
of administrators.”145 Kent State University also seems to acknowledge 
the importance of coaches in addressing student-athletes’ grievances, as 
its literature discourages students from reporting problems to the media 
and instructs them instead that “the coaches’ office is the only place” 
to take their complaints.146 
2. Coaches Employed by Schools Are Explicitly Empowered to Take 
Corrective Action 
Despite the few cases expressing skepticism, the courts have—with 
good reason—generally been at least open to the idea that a coach can 
be an appropriate person. The occasional hesitation seems to be due to 
concerns about their disciplinary authority, but as Section IV.A 
discussed, that is only the smallest concern when evaluating their 
authority to implement corrective action. To illustrate the breadth of 
options available, this case study draws from authorities applicable to 
a single employee of a single institution—in this case, Kent State 
University. 
A variety of authorities would explicitly empower—and in some 
cases obligate—that coach to take meaningful action in response to a 
credible report of sexual harassment or assault. Under federal law, state 
law, and university policy, the coach would have the authority to help 
eliminate the hostile environment by: 
• Reporting the rape to police for a criminal 
investigation;147 
 
145. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 181 (2005). 
146. Kent State Univ., Student-Athlete Handbook 83 (2014), https:// 
www.kentstatesports.com/documents/2015/2/16//REV_SA_HANDBOO
K_ALL_14_15.pdf?id=4222 [perma.cc/5WTG-WHXP] (emphasis added). 
147. Kent State Univ., Policy Register, ch. 5-16.2(D)(3) (“[U]niversity 
employees . . . are required to report to the appropriate law enforcement 
agency information brought to their attention concerning [felony crimes].”); 
Kent State Univ., Sexual and Relationship Violence Support 
Services, Your Role as Responsible Employee: Reporting Sex 
Discrimination, Sexual Harassment and Sexual Misconduct 
[hereinafter Role as Responsible Employee], https://www.kent.edu/ 
rvss/your-role-responsible-employee [perma.cc/HP5M-56WH] (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2018) (“All Kent State University employees are REQUIRED to 
report any instance of sexual harassment or misconduct to the Title IX 
Coordinator or a Deputy Coordinator, and in the case of sexual assault, to 
the police.”). 
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• Notifying the victim that she may report the rape to 
police;148 
• Assisting the victim in reporting the rape to police;149 
• Notifying the victim that she may be able to obtain a 
civil order protecting her from her harasser;150 
• Reporting the rape to the university’s Title IX 
coordinator for an internal investigation;151 
• Notifying the victim that she could pursue disciplinary 
charges against her harasser;152 and 
• Notifying the victim how to pursue these options while 
protecting her confidentiality.153 
Because none of these corrective measures would violate anyone else’s 
rights, any person, including the coach, would have the authority to 
implement them. 
The coach could also take action to address the effects of the 
harassment by: 
• Referring the victim to counseling;154 
• Referring the victim for mental health services;155 
• Referring the victim for victim-advocacy services;156 
• Referring the victim for legal assistance;157 
 
148. 20 U.S.C. § 1092 (f)(8)(B)(ii–iii) (2017) (requiring rape victims to be notified 
of rights and university policies concerning sexual assault). 
149. Id. 
150. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(iii)(IV) (2012). 
151. Ohio Admin. Code 3342-5-16.2(D) (“All employees of the university are 
required to report all instances of gender/sexual harassment, sexual 
misconduct, stalking, and intimate partner violence to the Title IX 
coordinator . . . .”); Role as Responsible Employee, supra note 147. 
152. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(iv) (2012). 
153. Id. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(v). 
154. Id. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(vi). 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
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• Notifying the victim about the availability of assistance 
in changing her academic, living, transportation, and 
working arrangements;158 
• Referring the victim to another university official more 
familiar with the resources available to the victim;159 and 
• Rescheduling the victim’s practices to accommodate her 
efforts to avail herself of the above services.160 
As with the corrective measures aimed at eliminating the hostile 
environment, the coach would need no special authority to take any of 
these actions. 
OCR also provides guidance on how to handle the offending party 
when sexual harassment occurs, calling for “reasonable, timely, age-
appropriate, and effective corrective action.”161 It suggests that the 
person receiving the complaint: “counsel, warn, or take disciplinary 
action against the harasser”;162 take steps to “separate the harassed 
student and the harasser”;163 and direct the harasser “to have no further 
contact with the harassed student.”164 
Once the coach’s attention turns away from offering the victim 
assistance and toward punishment for the offender, her authority is 
necessarily diminished in deference to a student’s recognized property 
interests in his education.165 
3. Students Are Obligated to Comply with a Coach’s Directives 
Still, as long as the coach ensured that her response was 
proportional to the reported misconduct and within the constraints of 
due process, she would enjoy substantial authority to pursue any of the 
 
158. Id. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(vii). 
159. See Ohio Admin. Code 3342-5-16.2(D) (2018). 
160. Ohio Admin. Code 3342-4-02.4(D)(1) (granting coaches authority to set 
rules for student-athlete training). 
161. Office of Civil Rights, Dept. of Educ., Revised Sexual 
Harassment Guidance 16 (2001), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/ 
list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5H2-P9N2]. 
162. Id. 
163. Id.  
164. Id. 
165. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) (“Neither the property interest in 
educational benefits temporarily denied nor the liberty interest in reputation, 
which is also implicated, is so insubstantial that suspensions may 
constitutionally be imposed by any procedure the school chooses, no matter 
how arbitrary.”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 4·2018 
No One Is an Inappropriate Person 
1372 
above options, and the offender would be obligated to comply. 
University-wide policies confer broad authority on university employees 
to make reasonable requests to maintain an environment conducive to 
education, and they subject students to disciplinary sanctions for failing 
to comply with those requests.166 And if a sexual assault occurred in a 
residence hall, that conduct would also be governed by Kent State’s 
“Hallways Handbook,” a separate set of rules imposing an independent 
obligation on students to “comply with reasonable requests made by 
university officials.”167 
Assuming that the coach is a faculty member, as is normally the 
case, she would also enjoy the substantial disciplinary authority 
inherent in that role. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the 
general authority of school officials to control the behavior of their 
students.168 In the context of higher education, Ohio courts have held 
that that power is especially strong among faculty members.169 For 
more than 100 years, they have said that matters of discipline at 
universities “have been left largely, if not entirely, to the faculty, and 
their action in such matters is binding upon the institution they 
represent.”170 That approach has been roughly codified in a statute 
 
166. Kent State Univ., Code of Student Conduct 2, 13 (2014), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150423043957/http://www.kent.edu:80/
studentconduct/code-student-conduct [https://perma.cc/2Z9C-NYM4]. 
167. Kent State Univ., Hallways Handbook 3.1 (2017), http://www.kent. 
edu/housing/hh-3-residence-hall-policies [perma.cc/5B5V-4YN7]. 
168. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) 
(recognizing school officials’ “comprehensive authority . . . to prescribe and 
control conduct in the schools”); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 
(1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (relaxing warrant requirements out of 
deference to “substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to 
maintain order in the schools”); Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 
629, 646 (1999) (acknowledging school officials’ “substantial control” over 
students’ conduct). 
169. Several courts have acknowledged the importance of these types of state-
specific considerations in determining whether someone is an appropriate 
person. See Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 239 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that principal was not an appropriate person because state law required 
superintendent’s permission to reassign an offending teacher); Hawkins v. 
Sarasota Cty. Sch. Bd., 322 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
an appropriate-person determination would require an inquiry into “the 
authority and responsibility granted by state law to administrators and 
teachers”); Annamaria M v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., No. C 03-0101 
VRW, 2006 WL 1525733, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2006) (acknowledging 
that state law determines who “exercises substantial control for the purposes 
of Title IX liability”). 
170. Koblitz v. W. Reserve Univ., 1901 WL 689, at *8 (Ohio Cir. Ct. Jan. 21, 
1901). 
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recognizing the broad authority of faculty “to take appropriate 
disciplinary action, through such procedures as may be provided by 
rule, regulation, or custom of such college or university . . . .”171 
Given the power to institute almost any of the OCR-suggested 
disciplinary corrective actions, an athletic coach easily meets the Davis 
standard and likely the higher bar set in Gebser. Because most of the 
authorities cited above are standard provisions across schools and 
across jurisdictions, and because they are typically not limited to 
coaches, a similar—and often expanded—portfolio of corrective 
authority is available to virtually any school employee who learns of 
harassment. 
C. Ross Is Wrong 
Given the established precedent recognizing the broad authority of 
coaches and schools in general to regulate their students’ conduct, the 
abundance of formal guidance on appropriate corrective measures, and 
the purposes underlying Title IX, there is little left to justify the holding 
in Ross, which took an exceptionally narrow approach to defining 
“corrective measures.”172 In so doing, the court afforded the school 
virtually no discretion to consider and impose the most suitable 
punishment under the circumstances. 
There was no suggestion in Davis that the Court expected lower 
courts to import its appropriate-person test for teacher-on-student 
harassment cases from Gebser into peer-harassment cases. The Court 
did not apply the test itself or say that the test should be the same as 
in Gebser; instead, it explicitly announced a different test, finding 
liability in cases “where the recipient is deliberately indifferent to 
known acts of student-on-student sexual harassment and the harasser 
is under the school’s disciplinary authority.”173 Ross makes clear that 
the Court needs to be more explicit still. Its holding—that Title IX 
offers no relief to a victim of peer harassment because campus security 
officers lack “authority to take corrective action” to address a rape on 
their campus174—is consistent with neither the test set out in Davis nor 
with common sense. 
In justifying its decision in Ross, the Tenth Circuit professed a 
certain degree of ignorance about how a police force works, finding that 
the plaintiff had failed to proffer sufficient facts to create a substantial 
question of material fact on points that most people would probably 
 
171. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3345.24(A) (West 2017). 
172. Ross v. Univ. of Tulsa, 859 F.3d 1280, 1289–92 (10th Cir. 2017). 
173. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 646–47 (1999). 
174. Ross, 859 F.3d at 1284. 
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consider too obvious to mention.175  This conceit was aided by the 
court’s recharacterization of the “Tulsa University Campus Police”—as 
it was consistently labeled in the District Court’s decision—to merely 
“campus security.” 176  So downgraded, the agency’s powers were 
suddenly open enough to interpretation that the court found it unclear 
exactly how “officers combat campus violence,”177 whether investigating 
a rape report would constitute corrective action, 178  and whether 
arresting a rapist would constitute corrective action.179 
It seems unlikely that many people would struggle with these 
questions or require detailed factual showings before conceding that 
when sexual harassment takes the form of rape, sworn police officers 
and even civilian security personnel would generally have the “authority 
to end the harassment.”180 Part of the problem appears to come from 
the exceedingly narrow conception of Gebser’s demand for notice to an 
official with “authority to address the alleged discrimination and to 
institute corrective measures on the recipient’s behalf.”181 The Ross 
court never defined what would actually constitute a corrective 
measure, but the only thing that it seemed to accept was action by the 
university’s dean of students, who presumably had authority to mete 
out punishments to students.182 
As Part IV explained, Davis rejects any attempt by either plaintiffs 
or reviewing courts to select and impose their own preferred corrective 
measures, whether punitive or remedial. Instead, they are bound to con-
sider the measures actually taken by the school and evaluate whether 
they were clearly unreasonable—and in so doing, they are obligated to 
extend the school a healthy dose of deference to those decisions.183 
 
175. Id. at 1288–89. 
176. Id. The court went so far as bracketing out Ross’s reference to “CAMPO,” 
the school’s vernacular for “campus police,” and replacing it with “campus 
security.” Compare Ross, 859 F.3d at 1291 with Appellant’s Reply Brief at 
12, Ross v. Univ. of Tulsa, 859 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 2017) (No. 01019732904). 
177. Ross, 859 F.3d at 1290 n.7. 
178. Id. at 1291 (“Perhaps investigation is a form of corrective action; perhaps 
not.”). 
179. Id. at 1292 n. 9. 
180. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283 (1998). 
181. Id. at 290. 
182. Ross, 859 F.3d at 1290. 
183. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999) (“[C]ourts 
should refrain from second-guessing the disciplinary decisions made by school 
administrators.”). 
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V. Resolutions 
Given these deficiencies in Ross, the Court should grant certiorari 
and take the opportunity to clarify the test it laid out in Davis. Most 
easily, the Court could explicitly differentiate the two tests and 
continue to apply different tests in teacher-student and peer-
harassment cases. It may, however, be easier to simply recharacterize 
Gebser as the generally applicable test for Title IX harassment cases 
while characterizing Davis as establishing a presumption that in peer-
harassment cases, almost any employee will have the authority 
necessary to be considered an appropriate person. 
The latter approach may be more sensible, as it would provide lower 
courts with a single test with broader applicability, streamline the 
analysis for a large share of the cases to which it is applicable, and 
retain sufficient flexibility to address the rare case in which a party 
with knowledge of peer harassment truly lacks the capacity to do 
anything. 
Moreover, this approach would shift the burden of proof to the 
party with greater access to relevant information. Operating in a 
framework where proof that the recipient of a report had authority to 
launch a rape investigation and arrest the perpetrator may not be 
enough to satisfy a court of appeals, plaintiffs will be required to engage 
in even more extensive and detailed discovery on the precise contours 
of the recipients’ authority, all the potential sources of that authority, 
its record of exercising that authority, and its record of exceeding that 
authority. Rather than imposing those costs on both parties, a simple 
presumption of authority would allow trial courts to accept as true an 
assertion that the Supreme Court has already acknowledged is generally 
accepted as a matter of fact and law, while permitting defendants to 
contest the issue in the rare cases where there is actually some basis to 
do so. 
Conclusion 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Ross is fatally flawed. It is not 
consistent with the landmark precedents on which it is based, nor is it 
consistent with the subsequent decisions reached by almost all of its 
sister circuits. These discrepancies provide sufficient grounds alone for 
the Court to review and reverse the case; more problematic are the 
implications of this decision on the innumerable students who are 
experiencing exactly the kind of discrimination that Title IX is meant 
to address but are nonetheless unable to find relief because their 
universities have failed to implement adequate procedures to encourage 
those students to report and reassure them that those reports will be 
taken seriously. 
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Contrary to Ross’s narrow conceptions of corrective action and 
school officials’ power to implement it, virtually any employee—and 
especially a campus police officer—has more than enough authority to 
take meaningful steps to mitigate the effects of sex-based discrimination 
on students’ educational experience. The Court should reverse that 
decision, clarify that this kind of analysis is too superfluous to be 
demanded, and provide schools an incentive to better protect their 
students from sexual harassment and assault. 
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